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REgions
Americas
Race to The Top: Brazil’s Racial
Quotas for Higher Education
In a groundbreaking decision, the
Supreme Federal Tribunal of Brazil,
Brazil’s highest court, unanimously ruled
that the race quotas used in public universities are constitutional. The Tribunal
issued its decision in April following a
hotly contested debate that challenged
the Brazilian ideal of “racial democracy.”
With this ruling, Brazilian lawmakers have
ushered in affirmative action laws aimed
at combating discrimination and educating
the historically marginalized Afro-Brazilian
population. Proponents view this expansive
move as the foundation for the possibility
to broaden opportunities for minorities
in Brazil.
The ruling arose from Ação do DEM
vs. cotas da UNB e no Brasil (Action of
Brazil’s Democratic Party v. Quotas of the
UNB and in Brazil), the case brought by
Democratas (Brazil’s Democratic Party
(DEM)) against the Universidade de
Brasilia (University of Brasilia (UNB)),
which reserves twenty percent of its enrollment spots for Afro-Brazilian, mixed-race,
and indigenous students. The DEM argued
that the policy was unconstitutional under
Article 5 of the Brazilian Constitution,
which protects equality for all citizens
regardless of race. The Tribunal rejected
DEM’s claim, finding the quotas to be the
best method to remedy racial inequalities
that were never confronted after the abolition of slavery in 1888. The Tribunal held
that racial quotas are the best transitory
option to close the inequality gap in higher
education. This gap is a major issue, as
a majority of Afro-Brazilians continue
to live in favelas and earn a fraction of
the salaries enjoyed by the predominately
Caucasian upper class.
On August 29, 2012, President Dilma
Rouseff signed the Lei de Cotas (Law of
Social Quotas). This law gives all federal
universities four years to ensure that half
of their incoming class comes from public
schools. The spots reserved for marginalized students will be in accordance to

the percentage of the minority population
in the state where each public university
is located.
Proponents of the university policy hail
the legal victory as one of the many steps
needed to ensure that the marginalized
populations, particularly Afro-Brazilians,
gain access to adequate education and
advanced job placement. Afro-Brazilians
constitute around seventy percent of those
that live below the poverty line and only
2.2% have access to higher education. Much
of the Afro-Brazilian population remains in
the lower echelons of the socio-economic
sectors of the country and receive poor
education in public primary schools.
Opponents of racial quotas view the
policy as a racial remedy for a socioeconomic issue. Critics believe that categorizing the population by race will
create a fractionalization of Brazilians
along racial lines and could result in officializing racial discrimination. Some see
the quotas as reverse racism that directly
violates the Brazilian Constitution by
favoring Afro-Brazilian students in the
highly competitive selection process for
public universities, while others view the
racial quotas as an imported solution from
the United States that is incompatible with
Brazilian race relations. These opponents
maintain a staunch ideal of “racial democracy,” or the idea that Brazil’s racial classes
were never clearly defined.
With the ruling of the Supreme Tribunal
of Brazil and the subsequent Law of Social
Quotas, Brazil has taken fundamental steps
to adhere to its obligations under the 1960
United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
Convention against Discrimination in
Education (Convention). Brazil’s policy
is in accordance with Article 1, Sections
(a) and (b) of the Convention, which
call on States to eliminate educational
discrimination that deprives citizens
of access to higher education. By implementing a national policy that promotes
more equality in educational opportunities,
Brazil has pursued an effective method of
reform that is recommended in Article 4 of
the Convention.
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In accordance with its obligations under
Article 1, Section 4 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (CERD), Brazil has a
responsibility to secure the advancement of
a racial group that may require protection
to ensure a fundamental human right. The
CERD protects Brazil’s reforms because
once the intended goals are achieved, they
will not favor Afro-Brazilians as critics of
the policy suggest. These measures can
also be incorporated in social, educational
and economic fields so that all marginalized populations can enjoy equal access to
a fundamental human right.
Race will not be the primary factor in
determining access to higher education
but rather a factor taken into consideration, which complies with Article 13,
Section 2(c) of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR). Brazil’s policy enables universities to serve the most vulnerable groups
without discrimination. Rather than maintaining a status quo that harmed a massive
segment of its population, Brazil’s policy
provides widespread access to the human
right of education, which is required under
the Covenant.
These efforts to expand higher education
for marginalized Brazilians coincide with
Brazil’s international obligations. The race
quota policy legitimately protects human
rights afforded to all citizens, and will
be crucial in ensuring Brazil’s continued
growth as a global power.

Beg Their Pardon: Fujimori’s
Possible Pardon
Former Peruvian President Alberto
Fujimori’s 25-year prison sentence for
severe human rights violations may be
coming to a premature end as current
President Ollanta Humala contemplates
granting the Fujimori family’s petition
for a humanitarian pardon on behalf of the
ex-president due to his health status.
During his time in office from 1990
to 2000, Fujimori was lauded by some
for his economic reforms and anti-terrorist stance that eventually crippled the
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“Shining Path,” a domestic terrorist organization. However, the Fujimori administration was also notorious for corruption,
bribery, and human rights violations that
ultimately led to the President’s imprisonment in 2009. The Peruvian population is
divided between those who remember the
former leader as moving the economy forward and eradicating domestic terrorism,
and those who remember his authoritative
rule that led to a self-imposed coup d’état,
kidnapping, murders, and other human
rights violations. On October 10, 2012,
Fujimori’s family formally requested a
humanitarian pardon to President Ollanta
Humala. The family cited tongue cancer
and other health issues as a humanitarian
justification for his release. The Peruvian
Constitution grants the President the power
to pardon and to reduce a prison sentence
if the prisoner has a terminal illness. A
panel of medical examiners assesses the
prisoner and informs the president of its
recommendation, but the president makes
the final decision.

citizens in the Western Hemisphere and
is crucial in establishing the framework
created domestically to determine the violations for which President Fujimori was
convicted. The UN Human Rights Council,
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(IACtHR), and other international bodies of
which Peru is a member have expressly condemned pardons for those who committed
grave human rights violations. In GutiérrezSoler v. Colombia (2005), the IACtHR
declared that “the State shall refrain from
resorting to amnesty, pardon, and statute of
limitations, and from enacting provisions to
exclude liability, as well as measures aimed
at preventing criminal prosecution or at voiding the effects of a conviction.” Similarly, in
the Barrios Altos case of 2001, the Court
overturned Peru’s amnesty laws protecting
all civilians and members of the State’s
security forces who had been “accused,
investigated, prosecuted or convicted, or
who were carrying out prison sentences, for
human rights violations” associated with the
Barrios Altos massacre.

Despite this constitutional power, many
Peruvian politicians have pointed to Law
26478 as an argument against the pardon.
This law denies pardon of anyone found
guilty of aggravated kidnapping, a crime
for which Fujimori was convicted. Other
politicians have remained open to the
possibility of a pardon if doctors, after
their thorough investigation, confirm that
Fujimori’s illness is terminal. A recent
poll has shown that seventy percent of
the Peruvian public supports a move to
house arrest or a pardon for the former
president. While some senators and other
allies of Fujimori continue to advocate
for his release on medical grounds, Dr.
Juan Postigo of the Instituto Nacional
de Enfermedades Neoplásicas (National
Cancer Institute) recently issued a statement declaring that Fujimori’s treatments
have been ongoing for twelve years and he
remains in stable condition.

If the medical examiners determine that
Fujimori’s cancer is terminal, President
Humala faces the difficult task of reconciling the powers given to him by the Peruvian
Constitution to pardon a criminal due to
terminal illness with the international legal
restrictions that prohibit a pardon for violators of human rights in nearly all instances.
Reducing the prison sentence for a violator
of human rights for reasons outside of the
“humanitarian” sphere would have deep
implications for the relationship between
Peru and the Inter-American Court, whose
decisions are binding on the country. For
now, the decision rests solely with President
Humala and while some remain optimistic
of a pardon, the domestic and international legal parameters are leaning toward
President Alberto Fujimori completing his
prison sentence.

The Peruvian Constitution acknowledges that a pardon must comply with the
international treaties that Peru has ratified.
Human Rights Watch has pointed out that
Peru’s duty to prosecute violators of human
rights cannot be undermined by amnesties,
pardons, and other domestic provisions
that grant immunity for these crimes.
Peru has ratified the American
Convention on Human Rights, which is
dedicated to protecting the rights of all

Ernesto Alvarado, a J.D. candidate
at the American University Washington
College of Law, is a staff writer for the
Human Rights Brief.

U.S. Voter Suppression May
Threaten Internationally
Protected Right to Vote
The right to participate in the political
process of government and have one’s voice
heard is fundamental to the authenticity of
any democracy. The U.S. Constitution prohibits voting discrimination based on race,
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sex, and age in the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and
Twenty-sixth Amendments, respectively, to
guarantee equal protection of the right to
vote. However, the U.S. Constitution does
not enumerate an affirmative right to vote.
Nonetheless, several international treaties
protect the universality of the right to vote
and prevent voter disenfranchisement of
minorities. The United States is a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, and the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination, both of which
protect the right to universal and equal suffrage, enumerated in Article Twenty-One,
Article Twenty-Five, and Article Five of the
documents, respectively.
Historically, U.S. laws and policies disenfranchised groups for the purpose of
voter suppression. African Americans and
other racial minorities, women, and convicted felons have struggled to realize their
right to vote. In the Jim Crow era, literacy
and poll tax laws discriminated against
African Americans. Poll tax laws required
citizens to pay a fee to participate in the
election, which disenfranchised African
Americans and poor white farmers in the
South.
With the passage of the 1965 Voting
Rights Act (VRA), most voting qualifications beyond citizenship were eliminated,
including literacy tests and poll taxes that
created barriers for African Americans to
cast their ballot. The VRA guarantees that
no person shall be denied the right to vote
based on race or color. In 1975, the VRA
expanded protections to other minorities
that face discrimination based on ethnicity or national origin. In Section Five of
the VRA, certain jurisdictions with segregationist histories are required to obtain
preclearance from the U.S. Department of
Justice for any changes to election laws,
ensuring that minorities are not disenfranchised by discriminatory state and local laws.
Despite the aforementioned protections, there is a current resurgence of voter
suppression in U.S. laws. Since 2008, a
number of states have passed restrictive
voting laws that will suppress the voter
turnout of minorities. Measures to restrict
votes include the following: requiring
government-issued photo identification,
reducing voting hours, placing restrictions
on early or absentee voting, limiting voter
registration drives, and gerrymandering
districts. In 2011 alone, at least thirty-four
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states introduced legislation that would
create new voter identification requirements or strengthen existing requirements.
Seventeen legislatures introduced strict
photo identification bills, eleven of which
became state laws. Jurisdictions not specified under the VRA successfully passed
these laws without being blocked by the
U.S. Department of Justice, regardless
of their equally discriminatory effect on
minority voters. Sixteen states have also
either adopted or are currently pursuing
citizenship-based purges of their voter rolls,
which may disenfranchise eligible Latino
voters. As the 2012 elections approached,
many courts reviewed challenges to these
laws to determine whether there was enough
time to ensure access to newly required
forms of identification before Election Day,
or whether the implementation of the laws
should be delayed until 2013.
By creating hurdles to the right to vote
through inaccessibility and unaffordability,
the voter ID laws will likely disproportionately impact African Americans, Latinos,
and other minorities; seniors; working
low-income persons; the disabled; and
students. Attorney General Eric Holder
compared Voter ID laws to a poll tax,
imposing barriers for the already disadvantaged. According to the Brennan Center for
Justice at the New York University School
of Law, approximately eleven percent of
adult citizens—more than twenty-one million people—lack a valid, governmentissued identification as required by some
Voter ID laws. Twenty-five percent of
African Americans do not possess a valid
photo ID as well as nineteen percent of
Latinos, compared to only eight percent
of Whites. The new requirements make it
difficult for eligible voters to exercise their
human and constitutional right by demanding documents, such as birth certificates
that people do not have, or requiring trips
to departments of motor vehicles that are
nearly impossible for some.
Under the U.S. government’s international responsibilities to human rights,
the government is obligated to continue to
investigate and prevent any laws that will
discriminate against minorities regardless
of whether a jurisdiction is subject to
Section Five of the VRA. In accordance
with the U.S. Constitution, the government is required to implement protective measures for minority voters to prevent discrimination. The right to vote is
beyond partisanship; it is fundamental to

the survival of a democracy that equally
protects all eligible voters’ rights.

Indigenous Community
Challenges Educational
Disparities in Guerrero
Vast disparities in access to education
persist across Mexico, impeding the full
realization of every child’s right to quality education guaranteed by the Mexican
Constitution and the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC). Indigenous
peoples are among the most disadvantaged and their rights are systematically
violated. Consequently, indigenous children are often excluded from the Mexican
education system or are unable to access
quality education. Indigenous communities generally live in difficult-to-reach
rural areas, which ultimately affects their
access to education and other basic services. According to the United Nations
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), twenty-six
percent of indigenous people aged fifteen
or older are illiterate, compared to the
national average of nearly seven percent.
Specifically, members of the Me’phaa
Indigenous Community of Buena Vista
in the state of Guerrero experience severe
impediments to realizing their right to
education. According to the Tlachinollan
Center for Human Rights of the Montaña
(Tlachinollan), a leading human rights
organization in Mexico, the illiteracy rate
of the indigenous population in Guerrero
is forty-one percent, even higher than
the national average for indigenous communities. Furthermore, estimates from
Tlachinollan indicate that the average
years of completed schooling among
Community members fifteen and older
is less than four years, compared to the
national average of nearly nine years.
Children of the Buena Vista Community
between the ages of three and six years
old must walk more than six kilometers
per day in rugged terrain to a neighboring
community to attend preschool. Over the
past ten years, the Buena Vista Community
has submitted multiple requests to the
Ministry of Education of Guerrero for the
development of a preschool center in their
own community, but the government has
repeatedly ignored these requests.
Article 3 of the Mexican Constitution
guarantees individuals basic compulsory education consisting of preschool,
primary, and secondary education through
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ninth grade. Furthermore, Mexico is a
State Party to the CRC, which provides
for the right to education in Articles 28
and 29. Under its international human
rights obligations, the State is responsible
for guaranteeing all children free, quality
primary education. Additionally, the State
is required to ensure minorities the right to
engage in their own educational practices
as well as to adopt measures to protect the
education of marginalized and minority
groups. Accordingly, in indigenous communities such as Buena Vista, the government is obligated to take additional steps
to ensure accessibility to quality education.
Under Mexican law, an aggrieved person may initiate a legal process known as
a juicio de amparo if individual guarantees
provided in the Mexican Constitution have
been violated. To file a writ of amparo,
the alleged injured party must demonstrate that a public official is responsible
for the injury, the injury infringes upon a
constitutional right, and the injury is not
irreparable. In 2011, the Mexican government enacted constitutional reforms to the
amparo system expanding protection to
rights not only afforded in the Constitution
but also those enshrined in international
human rights treaties to which Mexico is
a State Party. Thus, the Mexican government’s domestication of international law
further enforces its responsibility to prevent,
investigate, punish, and remedy any human
rights violation. To demand their constitutional right to education, members of the
Buena Vista Community recently filed a
writ of amparo based on the omissions of
the educational authorities of Guerrero. The
amparo addresses the key issues of nondiscrimination and physical accessibility for
the members of the community.
Despite recommendations from the
United Nations, civil society organizations, and requests from the local community, the State is consistently falling
short of its citizen’s educational needs, particularly those located in the mountainous
rural region of Guerrero. During his country visit to Mexico in 2010, the UN Special
Rapporteur on Education, Vernor Muñoz,
found that “exclusion from opportunities
of education in Mexico has a very specific group of victims, a situation which
can be summed up in a single sentence:
poor people receive poor education.” The
government’s violation of the right to education in poor and marginalized communities further exacerbates existing disparities
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faced by the communities and hampers
necessary development. The amparo lawsuit will challenge the recent constitutional
reforms in protecting marginalized communities’ access to social rights that have
been systematically violated. Under its
Constitution, the Mexican government is
responsible for ensuring that indigenous
communities have equal access to education
compared with the rest of the population and
for reducing the educational gap prevalent
throughout the country.
Diana Damschroder, a J.D. candidate
at the American University Washington
College of Law, is a staff writer for the
Human Rights Brief.

Asia and Oceania
Cotton Picking in Uzbekistan:
A Child Labor Industry
Every September, state-run institutions
in Uzbekistan lock their doors and display the words Hamma pahtada, Uzbek
for “Everybody’s gone cotton-picking.” As
the world’s third-largest exporter of raw
cotton, Uzbekistan’s cotton exports generate $1 billion in annual revenue. From
September to November, the entire country
is immersed in what has been described as
“cotton hysteria.” The harvesting process,
however, institutionalizes a tradition of
forced child labor. The Uzbek government
has not only failed to comply with the
minimum standards of international law, it
has also continued to promote child labor
to ensure that rising harvesting quotas are
met. As a member of the International
Labor Organization (ILO), the government
of Uzbekistan is legally obliged to bring
harvesting practices in line with international standards and could strengthen its
compliance with international child labor
laws by allowing the ILO and the United
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) to
monitor future harvests.
During harvest season, rural schools
are closed and students are sent directly
to the fields, where they are forced to
work thirteen-hour days. Harvesting under
police guard, children as young as nine
are forced to collect thirty to fifty pounds
of cotton a day. Thousands of children
between the ages of fifteen and eighteen are loaded onto buses and taken to
the fields, where their teachers are held
personally responsible for ensuring that
quotas are met. Students who refuse to

participate are beaten or expelled; teachers who refuse to comply are fired. Young
adults enrolling in Uzbek universities
are required to sign pledges promising
to participate in the harvest. Each year,
the Uzbek government denies the ILO’s
requests to monitor the harvest, and officials in the Uzbek Prosecutor General’s
Office have rejected complaints filed by
human rights organizations.
As a member of the ILO since July 13,
1992, Uzbekistan is required by Article
19 of the ILO Constitution to comply
with annual reports and recommendations.
In 2009, the ILO requested information
about labor policies and measures that
have been taken to implement Uzbekistan’s
legal obligations via international conventions. A year later, the ILO’s Committee
on Application of Standards requested to
have an ILO supervisory board monitor the
harvest. Uzbekistan has not complied with
either request.
In addition to an obligation to comply
with general ILO requests, Uzbekistan has
also availed itself to the Minimum Age
Convention (C183) and the Worst Forms
of Child Labour Convention (C182). C183
requires the minimum employment age
to be higher than the age of completion
of compulsory schooling but no less than
fifteen years. Children as young as nine are
required to participate in the cotton harvest
in Uzbekistan. Further, the convention sets
the minimum age for any employment that
poses a risk to health or safety at eighteen
years, and children between the ages of
thirteen and fifteen may only be permitted to obtain employment that does not
negatively affect their attendance at school.
By closing rural schools and requiring
children to harvest cotton, Uzbekistan is
failing to comply with these provisions.
C182 expressly prohibits any form of
forced or compulsory labor for children
under the age of eighteen. Every Member
State is bound, as a matter of top priority,
to implement programs to eliminate the
worst forms of child labor. Uzbekistan has
failed to comply with its obligations by
requiring children between the ages of nine
and seventeen to participate in the harvest.
The Uzbek government is also bound
by the recommendations of UNICEF and
its commitments to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC). Uzbekistan
acceded to the CRC on June 29, 1994,
thereby agreeing that no governing body
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would act in a way contrary to the best
interests of children. States Parties are
specifically obliged to protect children
from economic exploitation and hazardous
work conditions. Uzbekistan has failed to
uphold these standards by forcing children to work in dangerous conditions.
According to the annual Human Rights
Watch report, children working during the
harvest are more susceptible to illness due
to unsanitary working conditions, exhaustion, hunger, and the heat.
Uzbekistan is legally obligated to bring
its harvesting policies in line with international standards dictated by the ILO and
UNICEF. To ensure that harvesting policies
are in compliance with international law, the
Uzbek government must grant the ILO and
UNICEF access to monitor future harvests.
Until Uzbekistan begins to comply with its
international obligations, Uzbek children
will continue to be deprived of education,
freedom, and childhood.
Alyssa Antoniskis, a J.D. candidate
at the American University Washington
College of Law, is a staff writer for the
Human Rights Brief.

Chinese Drug Detentions
Facilities Receive Criticism
Despite Reform Efforts
Despite internal reforms in drug treatment facilities in the most drug-impacted
regions of China, human rights groups
continue to highlight complaints by detainees that facilities contravene international
agreements and Chinese law by subjecting
detainees to inhumane treatment and limiting access to judicial process. Until 2008,
drug rehabilitation in China occurred in
detention facilities called re-education
through labor (RTL) centers. RTL centers,
though required to administer medical
treatment for drug dependency, were frequently criticized by watchdog groups for
subjecting detainees to inhumane conditions including sexual abuse and forced
labor. In 2008, the Anti-Drug Law took
effect. The new law includes provisions
that address criticisms of the previous
system “in accordance with the humancentered principle,” while defining addicts
as patients and victims and guaranteeing
drug treatment. Multiple sources claim
that so far, the law has not had the desired
impact. Human Rights Watch issued a
report in 2008 citing numerous detainees
who criticized the new law, noting that it
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expands police power, increases minimum
sentencing to two years, and provides
no mechanisms for protecting the human
rights it claims to defend.
According to reports from media
outlets and human rights organizations,
compulsory drug detention centers continue to force detainees to work, deny
access to medical care, and provide no
access to judicial process. These conditions would put the government in breach
of both domestic and international law.
The Chinese constitution guarantees the
right to medical care for the ill (Article
45), requires oversight for arrests (Article
37), and guarantees public trial with the
opportunity for defense (Article 125).
The new Anti-Drug Law stipulates that
drug users sent to compulsory treatment
facilities must be detained in accordance
with the constitution (Article 50, AntiDrug Law). The International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), ratified by China in 2001, protects safe working conditions (Article 7)
and the right to physical and mental health,
including treatment of disease (Article 12).
The United Nations Economic and Social
Council elaborated on these articles, obligating States Parties to recognize the right
to health of all people, including prisoners and detainees. States are bound to
make acceptable health care accessible
to all, “especially the most vulnerable or
marginalized.”
The Anti-Drug Law prohibits unpaid
forced labor and physical abuse in Articles
43 and 69, yet Human Rights Watch reports
that violations continue, perpetuated by the
severe lack of oversight. The report cites
former detainees, who reported they were
forced to work eighteen-hour days and
were subjected to electrocution, beatings,
and other inhumane and degrading treatment. The New York Times reported the
story of one inmate, who said that life in
these compulsory rehabilitation centers “is
an unremitting gauntlet of physical abuse
and forced labor without any drug treatment.” The inmate’s comments indicate
the most striking of the alleged violations:
Though the new measures are done under
the guise of rehabilitation, neither medical nor therapeutic rehabilitation actually
occur in many of the centers.
Though medical and therapeutic care
is the purported intent of these facilities,
many reportedly operate without sufficient

medical staff and supplies. Because of
this, many users in detention facilities face
withdrawal without the help of medication.
This leads to relapse within the clinics,
where unsterile conditions, specifically
the sharing of used needles, exacerbate the
already staggering problem of HIV/AIDS
within the detention centers. Many centers,
however, provide no medical care to persons with HIV/AIDS and often do not even
inform inmates when they test positive.
Access to antiretroviral drugs is routinely
denied, even if the detainee was using the
medication prior to incarceration. These
policies suggest a conflict with China’s obligations under Article 12 of the ICESCR,
which requires respect for citizens’ rights to
mental and physical health, as well as “[t]he
creation of conditions which would assure
to all medical service and medical attention
in the event of sickness.”
Despite efforts at reform, the Chinese
government continues to receive criticism
for its handling of inmates. In October
2011, after several reported deaths in these
centers, the Chinese government issued
a regulation that affirmed the illegality
of forced labor and restricted the conditions under which detainees could work.
However, a May 2012 study by Human
Rights Watch found that the regulation did
not have the necessary impact on inmates.
Human rights observers continue to call
for the closure of compulsory drug rehabilitation centers in favor of a system where
human rights abuses are vigilantly prevented. Such an effort would give China
an opportunity to demonstrate its commitment to the ICESCR. Instead, many
reforms continue to create systems where
safeguards afforded by both domestic and
international law are absent.

Agricultural Reform in North
Korea: The Uncertain Prospect
of Economic Growth and Improved
Access to Food
Though news outlets recently brought
attention to a North Korean policy shift in
favor of agricultural reform, human rights
groups have since criticized the nation’s
leadership for the persistence of state-run
economic policies that function at the
expense of the welfare of its citizens. Such
criticisms of economic management in
North Korea draw attention to the large
number of citizens who live in deep poverty and lack food security. Estimates,
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though varying, suggest that deaths from
starvation or malnutrition in the late 1990s
numbered between 900,000 and 3.4 million people. The World Food Programme
categorizes roughly 7.2 million, or thirtyseven percent of the total population, as
chronically poor. Severe weather and famine exacerbate the problems of malnutrition and starvation, while insufficient pay
for farmers raises concerns that a lack
of motivation prohibits production and
adds to the State’s trouble with generating
adequate food.
Following the death of Supreme Leader
Kim Jong-Il in 2011, and the ascent of
Kim Jong-Un, some saw an opportunity
for economic development. The Daily NK,
a South Korea-based pro-democracy newspaper that covers North Korea, reported
that on June 28, 2012, Kim Jong-Un
announced an agricultural-reform strategy,
dubbed the 6.28 Policy, which has since
gone into effect in 3 out of 144 counties.
In the rest of the country, which is under
the existing Public Distribution System,
the government expropriates all output for
redistribution. The 6.28 Policy, however,
allows farmers who meet their quotas keep
a higher percentage of their yield and bring
that yield to market. The government’s
goal is to motivate farmers to produce
more without abandoning a state-centered
agricultural system. Such reforms could, in
theory, create a boon to the North Korean
public at large as increasing food production and allowing farmers to sell some
crops on the open market could improve
overall access to food.
The agriculture reforms are relevant to
North Korea’s adherence to its treaty obligations under the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), which obligates states to recognize the right to free pursuit of economic development (Article 1) and provide working conditions that include fair
pay and allow for a decent living standard.
Historically, regardless of North Korea’s
ratification of the treaty, farmers have been
forced to sell all crops to the state at a low
price, after which the government distributes the crops.
The effect on the food markets also
implicates both domestic and international
obligations. The North Korean constitution provides that the state is responsible
for affording workers with conditions for
obtaining food. Article 25 of North Korea’s
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constitution asserts the need to continually
promote and improve material wealth in
an effort to promote well-being. Under the
ICESCR, Article 11 obligates States Parties
to recognize rights to standards of living,
particularly protection of the right to be
free from hunger. However, despite these
legal frameworks, conditions of starvation
and malnutrition continue to burden North
Koreans. Further, chronically low levels of
production are exacerbated by economic
policies, including low compensation for
farmers and over-production of land. The
situation has not gone unnoticed. In a 2010
Resolution, the UN General Assembly
expressed its concerns that violations of
economic, social, and cultural rights have
led to “severe malnutrition.” The following year, the UN Human Rights Council
(UNHRC) reaffirmed this concern, particularly vis-à-vis other national spending
priorities, specifically the government’s
prioritizing of military capabilities over
the needs of its citizens. Of the gross
national income, estimated at $25 billion,
up to a third goes to military spending.
The standing military consists of 1.2 million people, making it one of the largest in
the world. The UNHRC, the United States
government, and human rights groups have
criticized this military-first strategy for its
misallocation of resources, and for leaving
many citizens suffering.
Although the agricultural reforms do
not indicate an interest by North Korea to
change its priorities, they do present an
opportunity to make some improvements
toward guaranteeing the rights and protections under international and domestic
laws. It is too early, however, to determine
whether these prospects will pan out and,
thus far, the application has been inconclusive. Outlets such as the Daily NK have
criticized the program for maintaining
state-run strategies that focus on targeted
production and agricultural collectives.
Detractors believe the 6.28 Policy will be
largely ineffective at remedying issues of
food security. Instead, experts urge reprioritization of North Korea’s expenditures,
shifting focus away from military spending and instead investing in the needs of
the people.
Gabriel Auteri, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, is a staff writer for the Human
Rights Brief.

Indonesia’s Aceh Province Adopts
Sharia Law in Conflict with
Human Rights Standards

their marriage and separate, warning the
couple that the punishment according to
Islam was beheading.

Under Sharia law in the predominantly
Islamic province of Aceh in Indonesia,
adulterers face death by stoning—punishment that is dictated by the Qu’ran.
Starting in 1999—when Islamic law was
implemented in the province—Aceh began
punishing those who breached Sharia law
by acts that include adultery, homosexuality, gambling, consuming alcohol, and
disobeying rules on attire. The nature of
these punishments, which range from fines
to the death penalty, conflict with both
national and international human rights
standards by impinging on the basic freedoms of all humans and imposing cruel
and inhumane treatment.

Aceh’s Sharia law, as it stands, conflicts with the Indonesian Constitution, the
1999 legislation on human rights enacted
by the Indonesian government, and the
United Nations Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT). The
Indonesian Constitution holds greater
weight than provincial laws, and therefore
must be followed in Aceh before the local
Sharia law. Article 28G of the Constitution
states the right of every person to be protected from the “threat of fear to do or
not do something that is a human right.”
Furthermore, Aceh’s corporal punishment
under Sharia law breaks with Article 28G
of the Constitution, which states that every
person has the right to be free from “inhumane or degrading treatment” and Article
28I, which propounds the freedom of religion and freedom from discriminatory
treatment. The 1999 Indonesian human
rights legislation established the right to
security and the freedom from degrading
punishment, the right to justice and due
process, and the right to freedom of the
individual and the right to freedom of religion. As a member of the United Nations,
Indonesia ratified the CAT in 1998, which
echoes the same freedoms enshrined in
the Indonesian Constitution and the 1999
human rights legislation, necessitating
freedom from cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment. Human Rights Watch and
Amnesty International described the practices of caning and stoning as cruel punishment inconsistent with the principles of
human rights established through international law, and thus Indonesia’s laws.

Aceh is the only province in Indonesia
that fully employs Sharia, and, as such,
Acehnese people are largely considered to
be the most pious followers of Islam in the
country. After Aceh’s numerous struggles to
assert its Islamic identity through rebellions
for independence, Aceh sought to unify and
appease its citizens in 1999 by codifying
Islamic law in the provincial legislation.
Sharia is the moral and religious code
of Islam. It mandates the way all Muslims
should live, as derived from the Qu’ran
and the Prophet Muhammad. Aceh originally implemented Sharia law to promote egalitarianism, but, according to an
International Crisis Group report, due to
abuse and misuse of the laws, Aceh’s
Islamic laws have encroached upon the
Acehnese people’s human rights. In 2009,
Aceh’s legislature passed a law penalizing
adultery between two married individuals,
which, according to a 2010 Human Rights
Watch report, carried the most stringent
punishment—death by stoning. Authorities
punish unmarried individuals with up to
100 lashes by cane for engaging privately
with someone of the opposite sex. These
Seclusion Laws allow the wiyatuyal hisbah
(Aceh’s Islamic police) to seriously reprimand, through fines and corporal punishment, any two unmarried people of the
opposite sex found alone together, disregarding evidence of physical contact.
Although there is no clause in the text
of the Sharia law that specifically outlaws
gay marriage, the Aceh province has held
harsh punishment for homosexuality. The
BBC reported that the wiyatuyal hisbah
forced a married lesbian couple to annul
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The conservative local community in
Aceh has made matters worse by pressuring the wiyatuyal hisbah to apply its own
punitive measures that extend beyond the
scope of the Sharia law, even in cases of
minor violations. Moreover, community
members are often the first to discipline
those who have violated Sharia law using
their own form of condemnation.
The community represses any discussion to repeal or amend the laws. Officials
and citizens fear backlash from more conservative community members for speaking out against the ill effects, abuse, and
misuse of the laws. Aside from entirely
repealing the law, if Aceh begins discussing
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the law, it could move to a less literal interpretation, as some countries have adopted,
by limiting the wiyatuyal hisbah’s role
and power, while simultaneously ensuring
due process for those accused of violating Sharia law. Yet, without a discussion
underway, the province of Aceh will continue to violate domestic and international
standards of human rights.

However, Bangladesh reserved its right to
apply Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention
concerning the issue of child marriage “in
accordance with the Personal Laws of different religious communities of the country.” Allowing personal laws of religious
communities to supersede international
law sustains the practice of child marriage
in Bangladesh.

The Bangladeshi Practice of Child
Marriage Continues to Disregard
Domestic Law and UN Conventions

Adherence to these principles can be
complicated in Bangladesh, where many
villagers believe that marriage protects
a girl’s chastity and is a divine command from God. As explained by Farah D.
Chowdhury, a political science professor
in Bangladesh, in a 2004 article in the
International Journal of Social Welfare,
all females are obligated to become wives
and raise a family and the sooner they are
married, the sooner the obligation is fulfilled. Additionally, the marriage of young,
submissive, and obedient girls maintains
the status quo of a patriarchal society. The
older an unmarried girl becomes, the more
her family will be shamed in the community. Beyond the religious and cultural
influences, there is an economic advantage
to child marriage. Girls are often considered a burden to families because of their
financial dependence. Once a girl has
been married, her husband’s family must
provide for her, thus liberating her parents
of their financial duty. When a family
is impoverished, there is consequently a
greater desire to marry off daughters at a
younger age. Further, the parents lessen
the financial strain of their daughters’
dowry since the younger the girl’s age at
marriage, the smaller the dowry can be.

Bangladesh outlawed child marriage in
1929. Yet, according to the United Nations
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), sixty-six percent of girls in Bangladesh are married
before they reach the age of eighteen.
Bangladeshi communities that continue to
practice the tradition of child marriage are
not only violating Bangladeshi law, but are
also violating United Nations conventions
on Consent to Marriage and the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW), to which Bangladesh
has acceded, and the UN Convention on
the Rights of the Child (CRC), which
Bangladesh has ratified. The practice of
child marriage is rooted in social tradition and economic need, but it has adverse
effects on the health and education of girls.
According to a report by the International
Center for Research on Women, child
brides are prone to suffer domestic violence and abandon school, and as a result
of early pregnancy are susceptible to health
complications. When the Bangladesh government developed legislation that led
to the Child Marriage Restraint Act of
1929, it considered various socio-cultural
factors—such as poverty and societal values—that drive parents to marry off their
young daughters. The law criminalizes
marriages when either party is a minor,
classified as girls under eighteen and boys
under twenty-one, and penalizes those
who permit or aid such a marriage, including parents, through a fine and up to one
month's imprisonment.
Bangladesh’s laws on the issue are
encompassed by its obligations, including
CEDAW, which the State ratified in 1984
and prohibits child marriage in Article
16(2). In 1998, Bangladesh acceded to
the Convention on Consent to Marriage,
which calls for the “full and free consent” of both parties in all legally binding
marriages in Article 1. Article 2 requires
states to set a minimum age for marriage.

Although young daughters’ families
might benefit from the arranged marriages, the effect on the child brides can
be severe. Many young brides have not
fully developed reproductively and are
at great risk for maternal mortality and
miscarriage. Marriage also limits a girl’s
possibility of schooling or further education. This is in direct violation of the right
to education provided by Article 28 of the
CRC. A young girl’s submissiveness and
obedience also makes her more vulnerable
to domestic violence and abuse in her husband’s home.
Despite the many laws that child
marriage in Bangladesh continues to
violate, Bangladesh has done little to
enforce the laws and protect children’s
rights. Fortunately the government does
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plan to register all marriages and births,
which would provide greater oversight.
However, Bangladesh’s reservation to the
Convention on Consent to Marriage indicates the country is not ready to confront
the differing practices based on religious
communities. Embracing the whole of
the convention both by dismissing the
reservation and implementing procedures
to enforce all obligations would broaden
protection for the Bangladeshi people.
Regardless of the existence of legislation
to combat the tradition of child marriage
in Bangladesh, insufficient enforcement of
the laws will preserve the practice of child
marriage to the detriment of young girls in
the country.
Anusree Garg, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, is a staff writer for the Human
Rights Brief.

Water Scarcity in Central Asia
May Lead to Conflict
Water scarcity is a looming problem
throughout the world, particularly affecting developing nations such as the Central
Asian states. Approximately 884 million
people do not have access to safe drinking
water. In Central Asia, obtaining an equitable division of the region’s major rivers,
the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya, is a disputed issue that may lead to armed conflict.
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the countries
that control the rivers, both have plans
to build hydroelectric dams, which will
give them substantial influence over water
resources in the region to the potential detriment of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. With
increasing water scarcity in Central Asia
and the vacuum left by a lack of binding
international law, the dam plans will make
achieving the seventh UN Millennium
Development Goal (MDG), ensuring widespread access to clean water, and realizing
the objective of UN Resolution 64/292 on
the right to water, increasingly difficult and
may send the region into armed conflict.
The effects of such a conflict could be
devastating, leading to the contravention
of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC) and the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW).
Historically, the Central Asian states
developed a standard for water and electricity exchange due to stringent Soviet
resource-allocation policies. In 1992, after
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the fall of the Soviet Union, the newly
independent Central Asian states signed
the Almaty Agreement, maintaining the
Soviet allocation of water, which favored
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Under the
agreement, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan do
not have enough water for their planned
development activities and are desperately
in need of the dam projects.
Because the right to water is not a
self-standing right in international human
rights law, dam projects by Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan would not necessarily be in
direct contravention to binding international obligations. The proposed dam projects will provide Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan
with urgently needed power. Despite this,
Uzbek and Kazakh leadership oppose the
dam projects, arguing that the projects
will disrupt water supplies in the two
countries, negatively affecting their agricultural exports and economies, and damaging the environment. If Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan move forward with their dam
projects, achieving the seventh MDG to
halve the proportion of the population
without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation by 2015
will be nearly impossible. It will also
challenge the goals set out in UN General
Assembly Resolution 64/292, promising
“to provide safe, clean, accessible and
affordable drinking water and sanitation
for all.” Though Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan
both agreed to the MDGs and voted for the
General Assembly resolution, these declarations are not legally binding.
Despite the lack of binding international guarantees for the right to water,
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan may reconsider
moving forward with their dam projects
because of the threat of war. Uzbekistan’s
president, Islam Karimov, stated that the
dam projects could lead to war because of
water’s importance to Uzbekistan’s agricultural exports, which make up a large
percentage of the country’s foreign earnings. Water conflicts, or “water wars,”
occur when a country controls the water
resources of another, water-scarce, country
and uses water as leverage. Human rights
laws guaranteeing the right to water are not
strong enough to adequately deter countries that may consider engaging in water
wars; however, the humanitarian effects
of water wars may trigger international
legal obligations. Women and children
in Central Asia are particularly in danger

from water scarcity issues because much
of the agricultural work falls on them.
They are often responsible for transporting
water to the home; thus, with increased
water scarcity they will be spending much
more time and energy transporting water.
Additionally, there is clear gender inequality regarding access to water, with rural
women facing critical problems in this
area. Despite the lack of binding international law on the right to water, by instating
policies that will exacerbate water scarcity
and lead to war, the Central Asian states
are ignoring Article 14 of CEDAW and
Article 24 of the CRC, which specifically
protect the rights of women and children
and their access to water resources.
The countries of Central Asia are victims
of a post-Soviet lack of a coordinated management system, but these actions could
likely hamper the goals set out in human
rights declarations. Without stronger human
rights laws governing access to water, the
region is highly susceptible to water wars,
certain countries and minorities are disproportionately affected, and water scarcity
will get exponentially worse due to climate
change and mismanagement of resources.
Emily Singer Hurvitz, a J.D. candidate
at the American University Washington
College of Law, is a staff writer for the
Human Rights Brief.

Europe
Russian Olympic Preparation
Displaces Nearby Residents
Russia’s preparations for the 2014
Winter Olympics in Sochi have elicited
concern from nearby residents and human
rights advocates that the rights of private landowners are being compromised in
preparation for the Games. While residents
have actively protested and petitioned
against appropriation of land for major
Olympic infrastructure projects, a Human
Rights Watch report from September 2012
presented significant evidence that the
Russian government continues to forcibly expropriate private property without
providing adequate compensation for displaced residents. Furthermore, those who
remain in Sochi contend that they live
with fears that noise pollution and emissions from the construction of a large-scale
power plant being built near the residential
area to strengthen infrastructure for the
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Olympic Games will threaten their health
and create an unsafe living environment.
Russia’s complicated history of transitioning from public to private land ownership has contributed to the confusion
surrounding these expropriations. During
the 1990s, the Russian government privatized and distributed land following the
collapse of the Soviet Union. This distribution process was often informal, and
did not always include official ownership
documents. Additionally, contradictions in
land registries often resulted in multiple
claims to a property. A Human Rights
Watch report notes that, due to deed registration issues, many Russians living in
Sochi could not prove ownership of their
land and have consequently lost property
without compensation.
Dmitry Chernyshenko, President of the
Russian Olympics Organizing Committee,
said that confusion over Soviet-era housing
assignments has caused difficulty with the
relocation of some citizens, but responded
to criticism by stating that some relocated
residents experienced significant improvement in their housing. The government’s
claims, however, are inconsistent with
many reports from monitoring organizations, which have found that property valuations do not take into account residents’
improvements and are less than tax assessments. When residents refused to sign
relocation agreements, a Human Rights
Watch letter to the International Olympic
Committee (IOC) from December 2010
found that authorities threatened to take
property without consent and open bank
accounts in residents’ names to deposit
compensation money.
The Russian government’s expropriations present possible conflict with the
Russian Constitution, which bars deprivation of property unless it is through a
court order and provides mutually agreed
upon, equal, compensation. However,
the Russian government passed a law in
preparation for the Olympics permitting
expropriation of property and allowing
the government to decide what it will pay,
if anything, to former private property
owners. Because property values in Sochi
skyrocketed following the announcement
that it will host the Olympics, critics of the
government have argued that the law was
enacted to allow Russia to avoid paying the
current full property values.
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Although the newly passed Olympic
law may give Russia domestic justification
for the expropriations, the country’s actions
are still subject to its treaty obligations.
Article 17 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and
Article 8 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) require protection
from arbitrary interference in home and
family lives. The ECHR is more explicit,
providing in Article 1 of Protocol 1 that
“[e]very natural or legal person is entitled
to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his
possessions except in the public interest
and subject to the conditions provided for
by law and by the general principles of
international law.”
Outside of pursuing claims with the
European Court of Human Rights and the
United Nations Human Rights Committee,
residents and advocates could look to
pressure from the International Olympic
Committee (IOC). The IOC Charter states
that it will “cooperate with the competent
public or private organisations and authorities in the endeavor to place sport at the
service of humanity and thereby to promote peace.” The provision could provide
an avenue—or at least a justification—for
the IOC to exert pressure on Olympic
countries to address human rights concerns, including concerns of expropriation.
The recent history of the IOC, however, raises questions about the mandate’s
strength. The Charter states that one of
the goals of the IOC is to “promote a
positive legacy from the host cities and
host countries.” Both leading up to and
following the Beijing Olympics, Human
Rights Watch and Amnesty International,
among others, called attention to conditions in China, including imprisonment of
activists during the games. Furthermore,
Brazil’s current demolition of the favelas
(shantytowns) in Rio de Janeiro in preparation for the 2016 Olympics raises concerns
over the IOC’s willingness to intervene in
Sochi. By declining to involve itself in the
actions of host countries, the IOC weakens its ability to influence human rights
issues. Without legal or IOC accountability, countries have fewer impediments to
enacting legislation even more detrimental
than Russia’s Olympic law. The individuals
would suffer while the world celebrates its
shared humanity through sport.

As the European Economy
Struggles, Nationalist Parties Grow
As the economic crisis in Europe deepens, regional extremist right-wing political parties, taboo after World War II,
are becoming more common due to their
policies promoting both nationalism and
protectionism. As the movement expands
beyond domestic politics and into the
governing body of the Council of Europe
(COE), it raises issues of negative treatment for minority groups.
In June 2012, the Greek political
party Golden Dawn won nine percent of
Parliamentary seats with its slogan “So we
can rid the land of filth.” A stark indication of the waning condemnation of such
groups came on October 1, 2012, when the
COE named one of the party’s parliamentarians, Eleni Zaroulia, a member of the
Parliamentary Assembly’s Committee on
Equality and Non-Discrimination. There
was an outcry from organizations such
as the Anti-Defamation League (ADL)
against her membership. The ADL has
complained of Golden Dawn’s well-known
xenophobic views and discriminatory
practices. Party members have denied the
Holocaust and publically shunned immigrants and other migrants, particularly
Jewish religious groups and persons from
Pakistan, India, Albania, and African countries. The party has advocated limiting full
political rights to only persons of Greek
descent and identity.
The rise of Golden Dawn has been
largely attributed to the economic situation in Greece. Nicolas Papakostadanous,
a spokesperson for the Greek Consulate in
New York, said, “This Golden Dawn is a
backlash, a byproduct of very austere, very
severe economic problems.” However,
Golden Dawn is not alone; it is part of
an emerging trend in Europe. Right-wing,
nationalist parties have gained political exposure in France, the Netherlands,
Hungary, Norway, Finland, and Denmark.
Extreme-right political parties tend to
merge welfare aspirations of the center left
with conservative themes of protectionism
and nationalism. Their ideology emphasizes that the government should provide
services, but those services should only be
available to native citizens. This has proved
an attractive combination for Europeans,
many of whom have lost faith in current
political leaders and seek alternative economic and political policies.
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The rise of far-right elements has not
gone unnoticed among human rights advocates. The ADL has urged the Committee
on Equality and Non-Discrimination to
reconsider Golden Dawn’s membership.
Alternatively, the ADL asked that Zaroulia
be rebuked for any statements that promote what is often described as Golden
Dawn’s “neo-Nazi” ideology and that she
be prevented from taking any committee
leadership roles. Additionally, on October
16, 2012, the European Union of Jewish
Students started a petition to remove Ms.
Zaroulia from the Committee.
Although granting membership to an
organization with a strong discriminatory message appears to run counter to
the goals of a committee seeking to prevent discrimination, removing Golden
Dawn from the committee would raise free
speech issues. Curtailing Golden Dawn’s
ability to express its viewpoints would
create a highly charged atmosphere in
which the issue of immigrant rights and
the danger of extremist ideals would be
lost. A less controversial choice would
be to urge the COE and other European
bodies to adopt broader, more effective,
anti-discrimination policies to prevent the
nationalist groups from gaining further
power while their actions go unchecked.
European regional institutions implemented two directives that have been carried out in relation to discrimination. The
first was created in 2004 and promotes
the principle of equal treatment between
people, irrespective of racial or national
origin. The second, created in 2008, establishes a general framework for equal treatment in employment settings. While these
steps offer some anti-discriminatory protections to Europeans, the legal framework is incomplete. The Commission
has proposed a directive to complete the
legal framework and prohibit all forms
of discrimination and harassment beyond
the workplace and provide an appropriate
redress system for victims through the EU.
Golden Dawn’s participation in the
COE’s Committee on Equality and NonDiscrimination is, at the moment, a political anomaly, but without adequate recourse
for those who experience discriminatory
action, membership of groups with similar
ideologies could become the norm and
pose significant risk for domestic protection of minority groups. Greece and
other countries in which right-wing parties
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are gaining political clout must also take
responsibility for implementing appropriate strategies to protect people who reside
within their borders. It is only through
cooperation between national governments
and international governing bodies that
minority groups can be protected from
the negative treatment advocated by these
right-wing organizations
Christa Elliott, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, is a staff writer for the Human
Rights Brief.

Middle East and North Africa
Protection of the Amazigh Identity
in Libya’s New Constitution
Comprising ten percent of the Libyan
population, the Berbers (who call themselves Amazigh, meaning “free man”) celebrate a cultural heritage that pre-dates
Arab expansion by thousands of years.
Though they do not consider themselves
to be a unified nation, the Amazigh have
developed a culture distinct from the Arab
identity. Under the Qaddafi regime, the
Amazigh faced constant cultural repression
from policies intended to eliminate any
non-Arab influence on society. After playing a fundamental role in the overthrow of
Qaddafi in November 2011, the Amazigh
were not offered ministry positions within
the National Transitional Council. In July
2012, a few Amazigh were elected to serve
in the Libyan General National Congress
(GNC), but the government has yet to
offer substantive rights to the Amazigh
peoples specifically, and to Libyan minorities generally. As the GNC begins to draft
a new Libyan constitution, it is obligated,
under the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (CERD), to provide comprehensive rights for all Libyan minorities,
including the Amazigh.
The two hundred members of the GNC
will attempt to eliminate the remnants
of Qaddafi’s Libya as they draft a new
constitution. The attack on the American
Consulate in Benghazi and assassination
of U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens
has highlighted the need for the rule of
law and consolidation of Libya’s central
authority, a demand expressed by Libyans
themselves. In the face of nearly insurmountable odds and increasing violence,

minority rights do not seem to be a priority
for the GNC.
In order to undo the cultural repression perpetrated by the Qaddafi regime,
the GNC must fulfill its international
obligations by abandoning several articles of Libya’s 1969 constitution aimed
at marginalizing distinct cultural groups.
The Qaddafi regime declared, “[T]he
Libyan people are part of the Arab nation.
Their goal is total Arab unity.” Amazigh
were expressly forbidden from practicing
their historical customs, celebrating cultural holidays, and bestowing non-Arabic
names upon their children. The constitution also mandated that, “Arabic is the
official [l]anguage [of Libya].” Qaddafi’s
Revolutionary Council could officially
approve other languages but even singing
in the traditional Amazigh language of
Tamazight was punishable by death.
The GNC is legally obligated to uphold
the international treaties to which Libya
is already a State Party, while considering
using the existing international conventions and declarations as a rubric for its
own constitution. In 1968, Libya acceded
to the CERD, and thereby agreed to amend,
rescind, or nullify any laws that perpetuate
discrimination. The GNC therefore has an
obligation to abolish laws that discriminate
against Amazigh culture and replace them
with structural protection of cultural identity. UN General Assembly resolutions can
also serve as models. While these resolutions are not binding, they are a persuasive
indication of international custom. For
instance, Libya was among the 144 nations
that voted for the Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples (Declaration), which
grants the right of indigenous groups to
practice and revitalize their cultural traditions and customs. Libya can uphold the
principles set forth in the Declaration by
incorporating protections for minorities in
its constitution. Further, Article 22 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) provides that the right to realize
social and cultural rights is indispensable
to free development of personality and creates a framework for protection of distinct
social and cultural groups. A successful
Libyan constitution could begin by recognizing Tamazight as an official language,
thereby making a statement of inclusion
by incorporating Amazigh culture into the
new Libyan national identity.
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The new Libyan constitution does not
only have the potential to be revolutionary for the Amazigh; it may also serve to
protect the rights of all of Libya’s minority groups and will set a precedent for
other countries in a similar transition after
the Arab Spring. Libya could become a
model for the successful integration of
marginalized nations, while also serving
as a springboard for further reform efforts.
These possibilities demonstrate the importance of the GNC bringing the new Libyan
constitution in line with the country’s preexisting international obligations.
Alyssa Antoniskis, a J.D. candidate
at the American University Washington
College of Law, is a staff writer for the
Human Rights Brief.

The Implications of Limits on
Religious Freedom in Israel
Tension between Israel’s secular and
ultra-Orthodox populations represents one
of the most difficult issues facing Israeli
society today. When Israel was established,
the country’s founders made an agreement, referred to as the “status quo agreement,” with the political leaders of the
ultra-Orthodox community. The agreement
gives ultra-Orthodox leaders authority over
religious matters, a widely inclusive topic,
as Israel has no separation of church and
state. It has led to deep-rooted tensions
between Israel’s ultra-Orthodox citizens
and the rest of the population, and has
put the country at odds with human rights
norms. Israel’s policies regarding religion
and state demonstrate a divergence from
several human rights norms, including
freedom of religion, women’s rights, and
minority rights. These rights are protected
by the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),
and the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD).
The ultra-Orthodox leadership has
authority over all personal status issues
for Israeli Jews. This includes marriage,
divorce, and religious conversion. The
lack of civil marriage or divorce options
in Israel forces all citizens to wed and
divorce according to state-sanctioned
religious authorities. Under this policy,
many Israelis cannot get married in Israel,
including anyone without an official religion, inter-faith couples, and same-sex
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couples. Article 18 of the ICCPR defends
“the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion.” Israel’s lack of civil marriage
and divorce violates Israeli citizens’ right to
freedom of religion. The ICCPR also protects people against coercion. Even though
Israel has signed and ratified the ICCPR,
and is thus legally bound by it, Israeli citizens are not free to make their own choices
regarding religion.

and … pursue … a policy of eliminating
racial discrimination in all its forms and
promoting understanding among all races.”
As a country that has ratified CERD, Israel
is legally bound to denounce and eradicate
all forms of racial discrimination, while
taking freedom of speech into account.
By allowing racial discrimination and racist incitement to continue, Israel is not
upholding its duties outlined in the CERD.

The status quo agreement has had farreaching effects on women’s rights in Israel as
well. In recent years, public spaces throughout the country have succumbed to illegal, forced gender segregation, with women
increasingly forced from the public sphere in
the name of modesty. Article 7 of CEDAW
asserts that states must safeguard women’s
rights as strongly as men’s, obliging states to
“eliminate discrimination against women in
the … public life of the country.” Although
Israel has ratified CEDAW, it is not upholding this Convention because it is not defending women’s rights against religious coercion. Article 7 also stipulates that the burden
to protect women’s rights lies on the State to
“take all appropriate measures.” Appropriate
measures include stifling religiously motivated exclusion of women from the public
sphere. Radhika Coomaraswamy, the former UN Special Rapporteur on violence
against women, its causes and consequences,
explained that States have a responsibility
to protect women from religiously motivated violence. There is no reason why the
States’ responsibility should not carry over to
defend all aspects of women’s rights outlined
in CEDAW against religiously motivated
violations. Israel’s status quo agreement cannot be used as justification for ignoring the
marginalization of women in society.

These examples demonstrate the tensions that exist between Israel’s status
quo agreement and issues of religion and
state. Through legal work in Israeli courts
and advocacy in Israel’s parliament, several Israeli human rights organizations
are striving to bring change in the area of
religion and state in Israel, and to push
the government to uphold its international
legal obligations. The Israeli government
has a legal obligation to make the necessary reforms to bring its policies into sync
with the human rights treaties that the
country has ratified.

Israel’s practices also violate its obligations under CERD. Israel’s minority
groups have recently been hit with a wave
of racism and discrimination, inspired and
perpetuated by public figures and religious
leaders. Racist incitement is a criminal
offense in Israel, but there is a trend of
community leaders using religious law to
justify racial discrimination. Throughout
the past year, several state-employed rabbis
have repeatedly referred to Israel’s Arab
citizens as “the enemy” and have preached
that all Arabs have a violent nature. These
rabbis have also urged Jews not to rent or
sell apartments to Arabs and not to employ
Arabs or shop from stores that do employ
Arabs. Article 2 of CERD states that countries must “condemn racial discrimination
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Sub-Saharan Africa
New Somali Constitution Seeks to
Protect Individual Rights
After over two decades of transitional
governance, Somalia’s National Constituent
Assembly adopted a provisional constitution, with 96 percent approval, that would
introduce sweeping individual protections
to a country that has struggled to form
a legitimate government. The constitution
went into effect on August 20, 2012, following the expiration of the Transitional
Federal Government and the appointment
of a new parliament. The event marks a
momentous occasion for Somalia, a country
often described as a “failed state.” Although
the document enshrines some fundamental
human rights, other provisions raise legal
conflicts that could limit the effectiveness
of the constitution’s mandates to protect the
rights of individuals.
To gauge popular support for the constitution, Somalia originally planned to
hold a national referendum, but logistical
issues—partly attributable to the presence
of the militant Islamic group al-Shabab—
thwarted the government’s democratic
46

ambition. Instead, the current plan calls
for the new parliament to vote on ratification, leaving the democratic nature of the
process unclear. The disjointed nature of
Somalia’s varying array of autonomous
semi-states has lead to a UN-sanctioned
process where clan elders appoint the
new parliament. This result—a product
of Somalia’s fractured governmental and
political system under which some regions
have declared autonomy—further separates the people from the constitution.
Although aspirations of open democratic governance will not be met at present,
the constitution’s guarantees of rights will
immediately become law. The Somali Bill
of Rights provides the primary framework
for individual rights and explicitly guarantees the foundational concept of equality
regardless of clan or religious affiliation—a
shift that overcomes significant historical
roadblocks to social equality. This guarantee reflects a foundational basic universal
human right established in Article 2 of both
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to
which Somalia is a party.
Expanding from this central concept,
the new constitution provides for progressive protections of women and children’s
rights in both social and political spheres.
In matters related to health and personal
security, the constitution bans the common
local practice of female circumcision and
provides for the right to an abortion when
a woman’s life is at stake. Demonstrating
progressive political policy, the Somali
constitution also guarantees the right of
women to hold elected office and stipulates that women must hold thirty percent
of seats in parliament. On children’s rights,
the Somali provisional constitution guarantees the right to education through secondary school and places an explicit ban
on the use of children in armed conflict.
Nevertheless, the constitution does fall
short of significant international norms by
stipulating a religious preference. It specifies “no religion other than Islam can be
propagated.” Further conflicting with the
right to religious freedom—guaranteed by,
among other documents, Article 18 of the
ICCPR—the constitution sets forth that
Sharia law forms the basis of the legal system. Aside from possibly restricting religious freedom, this leaves a constitution
based on Islam to govern both non-Muslims
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and Muslims alike. The provision could
further restrict the effect of the guarantees
of individual rights for vulnerable populations, as it explicitly states that all laws not
in accordance with the general principles
of Sharia are invalid. Some Somalis have
already objected to these rights on the
grounds that they are not in accordance
with Sharia. The primary objections relate
to the previously discussed guarantees of
thirty-percent female representation in parliament and the right to abortions in cases
where the mother’s life is at risk. Similarly,
opposition also exists to the ban on female
circumcision, which is estimated to affect
ninety-eight percent of Somali women.
Despite the possible conflicts, the provisions represent an express step by Somalia
toward confronting the lack of individual
protections in the country and overcoming the difficulties of the past—so much
so that the constitution also establishes
a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
The language of the constitution and the
effort to revisit the effect of past human
rights abuses and violence, similar to the
approach made famous in post-Apartheid
South Africa, conceptualizes the inviolability of the individual as a crucial element
of the new government. To what extent justice and human rights are made accessible
to the Somali people in practice, however,
will hinge on whether and to what extent
the new government is successful in implementing these innovations.

Nigerian Response to Insurrection
Raises Concern Over Torture and
Crimes Against Humanity
The Nigerian Islamic organization
ama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati WalJihad, known as Boko Haram, and Nigerian
security forces have engaged in a series
of violent conflicts, culminating in a military attack on October 8, 2012, that killed
an estimated thirty civilians in Maiduguri.
Earlier that day, a bombing killed a Nigerian
lieutenant, eliciting the military attack that
utilized troops and armored personnel carriers. Observing human rights organizations have raised concerns that the instant
violence is only the most recent conflict in a
long series of attacks that have claimed the
lives of more than 2,800 people.
Boko Haram is a militant jihadist organization in Northern Nigeria that seeks
to establish Nigeria as an Islamic state.
In 2009, Boko Haram began an armed

insurrection against the country using
bombings and armed attacks. More than
690 people in 2012 have so far fallen
victim to attacks targeting non-fundamentalist Muslims, Christians, and government
facilities. Nigerian security forces, retaliating against Boko Haram’s violent strikes,
have launched their own counteroffensives, culminating in allegations of human
rights abuses and crimes against humanity
by both sides in the conflict.
Human Rights Watch (HRW) and
Amnesty International (AI) reported that
Nigerian security forces utilize torture,
inhumane treatment, and extra-judicial
killings of civilians. These acts are in
conflict with binding provisions of the
Convention Against Torture (CAT) and
the International Convention on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), as well as general human rights principles encompassed
in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR), all of which Nigeria is
party to without reservations.
The CAT bans the use of torture in
all circumstances, specifically stating in
Article 10 that “internal political instability
or any other public emergency” cannot be
used to justify torture. There are numerous
reports of security forces removing suspected Boko Haram members and subjecting them to torture at secret government
facilities. Although Article 10 of the CAT
requires that Nigeria investigate and prosecute individuals accused of torture, the
Nigerian government has denied both the
existence of secret facilities and the torture
of detainees. In addition, HRW reported
that extra-judicial killings, including mass
executions and execution of family members, are numerous and have increased
since 2009. The extrajudicial killing of
suspected Boko Haram members would
implicate the rights to due process and
life found in UDHR Articles 3 and 10 and
codified in ICCPR Articles 6 and 9.
The reported actions of both Nigerian
security forces and Boko Haram also raise
allegations of crimes against humanity.
The Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, which Nigeria has ratified,
codifies the substantive elements of crimes
against humanity. Article 7 establishes
that acts of murder, torture, rape, persecution, and enforced disappearances are
crimes against humanity when committed
as part of a widespread or systematic attack
against civilian populations in furtherance
47

of a State or organizational policy or plan.
The October 8 attack by Nigerian troops
is reported to have targeted civilians—an
action that would be encompassed under the
Rome Statute. Furthermore, the widespread
reports of disappearances, torture, and
extra-judicial killings could implicate criminal charges. Nigeria’s denial of enforced
disappearances also satisfies Article 7(2)
(i)’s requirement of the same. Boko Haram
has carried out dozens of attacks targeting
civilians, and there are reports of murder,
rape, and inhuman acts causing serious
injury to mental and physical health.
The question remains as to whether
these reported actions were conducted
in furtherance of a state or organizational policy. On November 22, 2012,
the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP)
released its annual Report on Preliminary
Examinations. Preliminary examination,
as distinct from preliminary investigation,
is the OTP’s first step of investigating
situations for possible international crimes
that could formally be brought before the
Court. In this report, the OTP found that
while Nigerian Security Forces’ actions
may be grave human rights violations,
there was not a reasonable basis to believe
that the Nigerian Security Force’s actions
against Boko Haram were in furtherance of
a state policy or plan. However, the report
explicitly stated that this determination
was subject to change upon new information. In contrast, the OTP found that Boko
Haram does have a stated policy and plan
of attacking civilians in order to establish
an Islamic state through Jihad.
As a party to the Rome Statute, Nigeria
is subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC for
international crimes committed within its
territory. The OTP’s report found that there
is a reasonable basis to believe that Boko
Haram had committed the crimes against
humanity of murder and persecution. The
ICC is a court of last resort to be accessed
when States Parties will not or cannot
prosecute those responsible. The OTP will
next determine whether Nigerian authorities
are conducting genuine legal proceedings
against those suspected of responsibility
for crimes against humanity within Nigeria.
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